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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates how accrual reliability is associated with audit fees. Since the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, financial reporting has shifted toward a more principles-based 
accounting paradigm, along with an emphasis on fair value accounting by standard setters. As a 
result, auditors are exposed to more subjective accrual estimation processes, including accounting 
estimates. In the current financial reporting environment, external auditors are required to pay 
greater attention to accrual components that are largely based on accounting estimates to 
evaluate the reasonableness of accrual measurements. In this study, we find a negative association 
between the level of accrual reliability and audit fees. That is, the greater the potential litigation 
risk (due to accrual components based on more subjective or less reliable estimation processes), 
the more the audit work, and the higher the fees paid to external auditors. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
ince the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter SOX) of 2002, financial reporting has shifted to a 
more principles-based accounting paradigm with an emphasis on fair value accounting and accounting 
estimates.
1
 For example, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (hereafter FASB) has issued several 
standards related to accounting estimates, such as Statement No. 149 (2003), Amendment of Statement 133 on 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, Statement No. 132 (2003 revision), Employers’ Disclosures about 
Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, and 106, Statement 
No. 151 (2004), Inventory Costs—an amendment of ARB No. 43, Chapter 4, and Statement No. 123 (2004 
revision), Share-based Payment. As a result, external auditors are exposed to more subjective accrual measurements, 
including accounting estimates, to determine the fairness of clients’ financial statements. In other words, currently, 
balance sheets contain more subjective and complex estimation-based accounts such as goodwill, impaired long-
lived assets, in-process R&D, and pension and retirement liabilities and expenses. 
 
While accruals are fundamentally measured on an estimation basis, the reliability levels of the accrual 
estimation process vary widely among accrual components. Notably, the subjectivity in the estimation process 
directly affects the reliability of the accrual components. In this study, we posit that the subjectivity is negatively 
associated with accrual reliability. For example, it is easier to calculate accrued salaries or prepaid expense than 
pension and retirement liabilities and expenses, which are determined by a model with relatively more subjective 
factors. In the measurement process, managements could use subjective or discretionary accounts for opportunistic 
purposes to manipulate the firm’s performance or financial position. Thus, in relation to financial statement audit, 
external auditors need to pay more attention to these accounts with a higher degree of professional judgment. 
Furthermore, the increase in accruals with more subjective and complex estimation processes can expose external 
auditors to a more litigious financial-reporting environment and/or lead to additional audit work to evaluate the 
reasonableness of accrual measurements. 
 
                                                 
1 The definition of the principles-based accounting system in Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is based on a 
report of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2003), in which the principles-based accounting system was defined as 
objective-oriented accounting. 
S 
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In this study, we examine how the level of accrual reliability is associated with audit pricing. The audit risk 
literature (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Pratt and Stice, 1994; Simunic and Stein, 1996; Seetharaman et al., 2002) suggests 
that audit fees are determined by the combined effect of business risk and audit effort. For example, the uncertainty 
and bias involved in evaluating accounting estimates embedded in the accrual components may decrease the 
reliability of accruals, subsequently causing potential litigation risk and/or more audit work. 
 
Regarding the association between risk and audit fees, prior studies (e.g., O’Keefe et al., 1994; Pratt and 
Stice, 1994; Morgan and Stocken, 1998; Johnstone, 2000; Bell et al., 2001; Seetharaman et al., 2002) report that 
clients with high business risk pay higher audit fees. Other studies (Palmrose, 1986; Simunic, 1980; Simunic and 
Stein, 1996) document that audit fees rise as auditor litigation exposure increases. Because a high level of accrual 
subjectivity or a low level of reliability is more likely to increase litigation exposure due to the inherent subjectivity 
in accounting estimates, we argue that a level of accrual reliability is also likely to be an economic determinant of 
audit fees. 
 
At the same time, increasing subjectivity in accrual estimation in the course of financial reporting may lead 
to additional work by auditors to assure the reasonableness of the subjective and complex accrual estimation 
process. In fact, a body of audit-pricing literature (e.g., Simunic, 1980; Simunic and Stein, 1996; Seetharaman et al., 
2002; Schelleman and Knechel, 2010) suggests that the audit fee is a function of audit efforts. Thus, we postulate 
that, in the face of more estimation-based accruals, auditors may have to undertake additional audit work to assure 
the reasonableness of the measurement process of the reported accounting estimates. 
 
Taken together, we predict that firms with more accruals based on subjective estimation processes are more 
likely to pay high audit fees. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
 
H:  The level of reliability of accrual measurements is negatively associated with audit fees. 
 
While relevant prior study provides evidence that total accruals are positively associated with audit pricing, 
we argue in this study that each component of total accruals has a differential impact on auditor compensation, 
assuming that accrual components based on more subjective estimation processes produce less reliable accrual 
quality. 
 
In the following section, we describe the research design and sample used in the study. Results are detailed 
in Section III. In the last section, we provide discussions. 
 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE 
 
Following the study of Richardson et al. (2005), we decompose total accruals into seven components: (1) 
change in current assets, (2) change in current liabilities, (3) change in non-current assets, (4) change in non-current 
liabilities, (5) change in short-term investment, (6) change in long-term investment, and (7) change in financial 
liabilities. According to Richardson et al. (2005), each accrual component has a different level of reliability due to a 
different magnitude of accounting estimates embedded in it. They suggest that the following accrual components are 
less reliable: change in current assets, change in non-current assets, change in non-current liabilities, and change in 
long-term investment. In other words, their accrual quality is lower than that of the other accrual components. For 
example, current assets involve more subjective (i.e., less reliable) accrual measurements of allowance for doubtful 
accounts and inventory cost flow assumptions, which are respectively related to receivables and inventory. Non-
current assets require the estimation of write-downs and amortization, related to property, plant and equipment, and 
intangible assets. 
 
As per the above discussion, we create the variable ∆LessReliable_EST, which combines four accrual 
components: change in current assets (∆COA), change in non-current assets (∆NCOA), change in non-current 
liabilities (∆NCOL), and change in long-term investment (∆LTI). The variable ∆LessReliable_EST includes accrual 
components based on more subjective (i.e., less reliable) estimation processes. 
 
To test the hypothesis, we use the following regression model. 
LOGAFit = α0+α1ǀ∆ LessReliable_ESTitǀ+α2ǀ∆COLitǀ+α3ǀ∆STIitǀ+α4ǀ∆FINLitǀ+α5CTRLit+εit 
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where LOGAF is a natural logarithm of audit fees and ǀ∆ LessReliable_ESTǀ is the sum of the following variables: 
ǀ∆COAǀ (absolute value of change in current assets), ǀ∆NCOAǀ (absolute value of change in non-current assets), 
ǀ∆NCOLǀ (absolute value of change in non-current liabilities), and ǀ∆LTIǀ (absolute value of change in long-term 
investment). ǀ∆COLǀ is the absolute value of change in current liabilities, ǀ∆STIǀ the absolute value of change in 
short-term investment, and ǀ∆FINLǀ the absolute value of change in financial liabilities. CTRL is a group of control 
variables: profitability (ROA), measured as operating income after depreciation (OIADP in Compustat data) deflated 
by average total assets, leverage (LEV), measured as long-term debt (DLTT in Compustat data) deflated by average 
total assets, capital intensity (CAP), measured as depreciation expense (DPC in Compustat data) deflated by sales 
(SALE in Compustat data), total assets (LOGTA), loss (LOSS), industry-dummy variables (two-digit SIC code), and 
a time-dummy variable. 
 
We postulate that the variable ǀ∆ LessReliable_ESTǀ, which is based on subjective estimation processes (and 
therefore has relatively lower accrual reliability), has a positive coefficient in the empirical regression model above. 
 
We obtained financial data from the Compustat Fundamental Annual file and data on external auditors and 
audit fees from Audit Analytics. We collected data for the sample period 2003 to 2004. From the initial sample, we 
excluded observations in regulated industries, such as the utilities industry (SIC codes 4900 through 4999) and the 
financial industry (SIC codes 6000 through 6999). We also excluded observations for which financial data, external 
auditors’ data, or audit fees data were incomplete. The final sample consisted of 8,216 firm-year observations. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of key variables. The mean (median) of the variable ǀ∆ 
LessReliable_EST ǀ is 0.241(0.139). The means (medians) of the variables ǀ∆COLǀ, ǀ∆STIǀ, and ǀ∆FINLǀ are 0.104, 
0.041, and 0.126 (0.034, 0.000, and 0.032), respectively, implying that each distribution is positively skewed. 
Meanwhile, the variable ROA (mean: -0.174, median: 0.045) is negatively skewed. The mean (median) of LOGTA is 
4.998 (4.981). 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 5% 25% 75% 95% 
ǀ∆LessReliable_ESTǀ  0.241 0.139 0.299 0.028 0.074 0.274 0.842 
ǀ∆COLǀ 0.104 0.034 0.319 0.002 0.013 0.074 0.357 
ǀ∆STIǀ 0.041 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.236 
ǀ∆FINLǀ 0.126 0.032 0.335 0.000 0.004 0.100 0.515 
ROA -0.174 0.045 0.988 -1.019 -0.086 0.110 0.224 
LOGAF 0.469 0.260 0.549 0.033 0.110 0.616 1.640 
LOGTA 4.998 4.981 2.431 0.985 3.204 6.667 9.229 
Note: ǀ∆LessReliable_EST ǀ is the sum of the following variables: ǀ∆COAǀ, the absolute value of change in current assets (= 
current assets [ACT in Compustat data] – cash and short-term investments [CHE in Compustat data]), ǀ∆NCOAǀ, the absolute 
value of change in non-current assets (= total assets [AT in Compustat data] – current assets [ACT in Compustat data] – 
investments and advances [IVAO in Compustat data]), ǀ∆NCOLǀ the absolute value of change in non-current liabilities (= total 
liabilities [LT in Compustat data] – current liabilities [LCT in Compustat data] – long-term debt [DLTT in Compustat data]), 
ǀ∆LTIǀ, the absolute value of change in long-term investment (IVAO in Compustat data). ǀ∆COLǀ, the absolute value of change in 
current liabilities (= current liabilities [LCT in Compustat data] – debt in current liabilities [DLC in Compustat data]), ǀ∆STIǀ, the 
absolute value of change in short-term investments (IVST in Compustat data), and ǀ∆FINLǀ, the absolute value of change in 
financial liabilities(= long-term debt [DLTT in Compustat data] + debt in current liabilities [DLC in Compustat data] + preferred 
stock [PSTK in Compustat data]). LOGAF is the natural logarithm of audit fees, and LOGTA stands for the natural logarithm of 
total assets. 
 
 Table 2 reports the correlation among the key variables. Auditor compensation (LOGAF) and client size 
(LOGTA) are positively and significantly correlated with each other (correlation = .765, p < .0001). The correlation 
between ǀ∆COLǀ and ǀ∆FINLǀ is 0.915 (p < .0001).2 The other correlations are below 0.6. 
 
                                                 
2 We reran the empirical regression in this study, dropping each variable in turn; however, the results remained the same. 
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Table 2 
Correlation Coefficients of Key Variables 
Note: See Table 1 for the definitions of variables. The upper number in each cell is the Pearson correlation coefficient, and the 
lower number the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
 The empirical regression results are shown in Table 3. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
audit fees. The coefficient (0.034) of the variable ǀ∆ LessReliable_EST ǀ is positive and significant (t-statistic = 3.63) 
at the 1% level, supporting the argument that the estimation subjectivity embedded in the less reliable accrual 
components of ǀ∆ LessReliable_EST ǀ increases audit risk and/or audit efforts. However, the other accrual 
components (i.e., ǀ∆COLǀ, ǀ∆STIǀ, and ǀ∆FINLǀ), which are relatively more reliable, are negatively correlated with 
audit fees. These findings are interesting, because prior relevant research documents a positive association between 
total accruals and audit fees, suggesting that total accruals represent information risk (i.e., noise). When 
decomposing total accruals into several components based on accrual reliability, we find that, while less reliable 
accrual components increase audit fees, relatively more reliable accrual components decrease audit fees, indicating 
that two total-accrual forces acting in opposite directions determine audit fees. Moreover, as shown in Table 3, the 
coefficient (0.215) of LOGTA is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that client size is one of the 
most important factors in determining audit fees. 
 
Table 3 
Audit Fees Regression 
Variablea 
Expected 
sign 
Dependent Variable: LOGAF 
Coefficient t-statisticb 
Intercept ? -0.829*** -43.23 
ǀ∆LessReliable_ESTǀ + 0.034*** 3.63 
ǀ∆COLǀ + -0.017 -2.95 
ǀ∆STIǀ + -0.063 -2.08 
ǀ∆FINLǀ + -0.064 -8.28 
ROA - -0.062*** -16.69 
CAP + -0.006 -1.08 
LEV ? 0.018*** 9.98 
LOSS ? 0.069*** 8.74 
LOGTA + 0.215*** 67.87 
IND ? Yes 
YEAR ? Yes 
Adjusted R2  65.34% 
No. of obs.  8,216 
Note: See Table 1 for the definitions of variables. 
aROA (profitability) = operating income after depreciation (OIADP in Compustat data) deflated by average total assets; CAP 
(capital intensity) = depreciation expense (DPC in Compustat data) deflated by sales (SALE in Compustat data); LEV (leverage) 
= long-term debt (DLTT in Compustat data) deflated by average total assets; LOSS = loss dummy variable; LOGTA = natural 
logarithm of total assets; IND = industry-dummy variables (two-digit SIC code); YEAR = time dummy variable. 
bThe reported t-statistics in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are adjusted by using a heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard error (White, 1980) 
*, **, and, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Variable ǀ ∆LessReliable_EST ǀ ǀ∆COLǀ ǀ∆STIǀ ǀ∆FINLǀ LOGAF LOGTA 
ǀ∆LessReliable_ESTǀ  
0.228 
<.0001 
-0.008 
0.466 
0.270 
<.0001 
0.130 
<.0001 
0.145 
<.0001 
ǀ∆COLǀ 
0.521 
<.0001 
 
0.031 
0.005 
0.915 
<.0001 
0.113 
<.0001 
0.490 
<.0001 
ǀ∆STIǀ 
-0.013 
0.255 
-0.025 
0.024 
 
0.028 
0.011 
-0.036 
0.001 
-0.050 
<.0001 
ǀ∆FINLǀ 
0.453 
<.0001 
0.637 
<.0001 
-0.093 
<.0001 
 
0.293 
<.0001 
0.507 
<.0001 
LOGAF 
0.290 
<.0001 
0.525 
<.0001 
0.026 
0.019 
0.544 
<.0001 
 
0.765 
<.0001 
LOGTA 
0.306 
<.0001 
0.552 
<.0001 
0.029 
0.007 
0.591 
<.0001 
0.862 
<.0001 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
While accruals are in principle estimation based, some accruals (goodwill, impaired long-lived assets, in-
process R&D) are more subjective in the estimation process. The recent shift to a principles-based accounting 
paradigm by standard-setters has exposed external auditors to more subjective and complex accrual estimation 
processes. In this study, we investigate how the level of reliability of each accrual component in total accruals 
affects audit fees. We find that accrual components based on more subjective estimation processes (i.e., less reliable 
accrual components) lead to more audit fees.  In other words, the higher the business risk (or the greater the audit 
work due to the subjectivity in the estimation process), the higher the audit fees. This finding—which has not been 
considered in related prior literature—is important to policy makers and accounting and auditing professionals in 
that two forces acting in opposite directions (i.e., more vs. less reliable accrual components) determine audit fees. 
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